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INTRODUCTION
Clemency has been embedded in the American criminal justice system since America was founded. 1  Justified under a mixture
of retributive, redemptive, and utilitarian principles, 2  “clemency” covers “a variety of mechanisms an executive can use to
remit the consequences of a crime,” 3  including pardons, commutations of *56  sentence, reprieves, and the remission of
fines and forfeitures. 4  Through these mechanisms, executives and/or administrative bodies can accomplish such diverse goals
as restore civil rights, acknowledge mitigating circumstances, correct egregious sentences, prevent deportations, and support
political agendas. 5  They can also correct the wrongful conviction of innocents.
In the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins, the United States Supreme Court (USSC) placed extreme confidence in the clemency
function to remedy wrongful convictions. 6  In ruling that Herrera's claim of actual innocence (absent some other procedural
violation in his case) was not a ground for federal habeas relief, the USSC held that: (1) clemency is the “fail safe” of the
criminal justice system; 7  (2) state clemency processes are the proper mechanism for assessing innocence claims; 8  and (3)
clemency is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where the judicial process has been exhausted. 9
The Supreme Court decided Herrera just as the American Innocence Movement was gaining momentum. The year before, in
1992, Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld formed The Innocence Project “to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent
through DNA testing.” 10  By the end of 1993, one hundred and thirty-five people had been exonerated, 11  including fourteen
whose innocence had been conclusively proven by post-conviction DNA evidence. 12  *57  Since then, however, a number
of disturbing cases--such as those of Cameron Todd Willingham 13  and Troy Anthony Davis 14 -- have steadily highlighted
the inadequacy of clemency in providing relief to innocent inmates. In spite of presenting significant evidence of innocence,
Willingham and Davis were refused clemency by governors in Texas and Georgia, respectively, and were executed soon
thereafter. 15  Concerns about clemency's ability to provide relief to innocent inmates have been exacerbated by the USSC's
decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard. 16  In Woodard, the USSC afforded only “minimal” due process protections
to defendants in clemency proceedings and held--in spite of the holding in Herrera that clemency is the “fail safe” of the
criminal justice system-- that clemency proceedings are not “an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating guilt
or innocence of a defendant.” 17
This article considers to what extent clemency is fit to handle innocence claims, particularly from the perspective of innocents
who are incarcerated and seeking post-conviction relief. Part I traces the *58  history of clemency and demonstrates how it
has never served a significant legal function or been truly “innocentric” in nature, but rather was an exercise of political power
inherently unfavorable to innocents. Part II reviews current clemency frameworks across America and explores the obstacles
innocents face when applying for relief, including a lack of transparency, imbalanced administrative board compositions, and
THE CONTROVERSY OF CLEMENCY AND INNOCENCE IN..., 51 Cal. W. L. Rev. 55
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
barriers to meaningful review, including high eligibility thresholds and unfavorable application procedures. Part III evaluates
the effectiveness of Woodard's minimal due process standard for protecting against unfair clemency procedures by reviewing a
cohort of cases in which state clemency procedures were challenged on the basis of unfairness. The cases discussed in Part III
demonstrate that courts are applying Woodard narrowly, and are generally reluctant to interfere in state clemency processes--
an approach unfavorable to innocents seeking relief through clemency. Part IV concludes that clemency, to a large extent,
is a hostile environment for innocence claims, given the few historical or contemporary frameworks dedicated to evaluating
innocence claims, obstacles to meaningful review, antipathetic executive attitudes, minimal constitutional protection, and courts'
reluctance to interfere with state procedures.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CLEMENCY: A POWER FOR POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE
This section highlights major landmarks in the evolution of the clemency power from the theological foundation of mercy
to clemency practices in early America to the eventual thrusting of the clemency power into the criminal justice system as
a mechanism for identifying wrongful convictions during the “era of innocence.” This examination of the development of
clemency exposes it as a political power, neither designed nor routinely used to remedy wrongful convictions.
A. God, Ancient Egypt, and Ancient Rome
While American executive clemency is rooted in common law tradition, the concept of “mercy” can be traced well beyond the
common law era. Unlike the modern clemency power, which is vested in state officials, the historical foundation of mercy was
divine. *59  For example, the ancient Egyptian slaves of Deir El-Medina believed that blindness was a punishment, which could
be withdrawn by the merciful goddess Meretseger in return for the offender repenting his sins. 18  The first documented human-
vested clemency power was in early Greek democracies, where the power was vested in the supreme democratic legislature,
Ecclesia. 19  With the fall of democracy in the Roman Empire, however, clemency was removed from the people and vested
solely in the Emperor, 20  beginning its journey to the executive clemency power we have today.
This shift in investiture from the legislature to the Emperor was important for two particular reasons. First, as Ancient Rome lost
its democratic character and moved toward an autocratic rule, the potential for tyranny increased. 21  As such, several authors
have suggested that the public exercise of mercy was politically essential in order to offset the newfound “awesome abilities of
the state to inflict harm” 22  and to embed a divine quality in rulers. 23  In fact, Julius Caesar was known for his repeated acts of
mercy toward defeated opponents, 24  with the modern term “clemency” derived from “Clementia,” the goddess of forgiveness
and mercy, deified as a celebrated virtue of Julius Caesar. 25  Second, the exercise of mercy through clemency came to symbolize
the absolute power with which the Emperor ruled. 26  In particular, the act of pardoning placed the grantor in a position of
ruling over the grantee, forcing a defeated *60  opponent, for example, into a lasting position of weakness. 27  As such, while
the possession of the divine quality of mercy was important to the general population, the exercise of clemency was deeply
resented within the political class. 28  Considering this, few of Caesar's contemporaries viewed the act of clemency as one of
mercy; rather, clemency was largely regarded as a “manifestation of tyrannical power” 29  or, at least, as a political tool that
“once . . . [it] ceased to convey the advantage to Caesar, he would drop.” 30  It appears, therefore, that the Roman clemency
power was concerned primarily with political expediency, not considerations of mercy, and certainly was not used to ensure
justice. Furthermore, in that era, the act of clemency was not designed with the intention of ensuring justice. Instead, arguably,
the power inherent in Roman “clemency” was derived specifically from the act of granting grace to an individual who did not
deserve or warrant such--an individual the law had every right to punish, but who was, nevertheless, treated more leniently by
their ruler. As such, mercy could be considered antithetical to justice. 31
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Over time, even as the clemency power moved away from the Emperor and into the hands of judges, it continued to fulfill a
primarily political purpose. 32
*61  B. Clemency and the Common Law
Although pardons were recorded prior to the Norman conquest of England, 33  it was not until after 1066 and the Battle of
Hastings that the King's pardon power was codified in the Code of William the Conqueror. 34  Like in Ancient Rome, exercise
of the King's pardon power was rarely related to considerations of mercy or justice and was primarily concerned with political
and/or economic expediency. For example, by the time of Henry I, codified laws explicitly allowed the exchange of pardons
for money, 35  and Edward I granted pardons in exchange for military service. 36
Unlike the Ancient Roman pardon power, however, English monarchs shared the right to be merciful with Roman Catholic
clergymen, who exercised a divine mercy. 37  Although several monarchs struggled with this sharing of power, it was only
following Henry VIII's split from the Catholic Church that the English Parliament passed an act granting the King “sole power
and *62  auctoritie,” which vested the clemency power solely in the monarch. 38  The power to grant clemency remained solely
the preserve of the monarch for over two centuries, confirming his or her absolute sovereignty. 39
Ultimately, a lack of oversight or legal recourse in relation to grants of clemency played a central role in the fall of this autocratic
regime. In 1678, King Charles II's use of the pardon power to thwart the intentions of the democratically elected parliament
led to a constitutional crisis. 40  Subsequently, the pardon power was gradually withdrawn from the monarch and granted to
a combination of the government and parliament, where it remains today. 41  As such, history shows, regardless of where the
clemency power has been vested from the time of ancient Rome to Enlightenment England, one thing has remained constant:
its primary function has been to further or consolidate a position of power.
This trend continued when clemency “arrived” in America.
C. Clemency in America
This subsection considers the development of the clemency power in America at the state and federal levels. Although this
article concentrates on state clemency proceedings, an exploration of the *63  development of the federal clemency power is
useful in illustrating the largely political focus of the clemency power in America. Moreover, the state and federal powers have
taken a similar evolutionary journey.
1. Early American Clemency
With the expansion of the British Colonial Empire, clemency was often utilized to curry favor with the local, indigenous
American population. 42  As such, the monarch--who remained, at that time, the sole individual vested with the clemency
power--customarily bestowed on colonial governors the power to grant clemency on his behalf. 43  By 1776, therefore, the
concept of clemency was familiar to the American political system and to the Founding Fathers. Clemency was understood
to be “one of the great advantages of the monarchy;” 44  therefore, it was considered as greatly beneficial in buttressing the
monarchial power the Founding Fathers were trying to replace.
Following the American Revolution, there was a concerted attempt among the states to move away from a central executive
power. 45  Consequently, when drafting their constitutions, the majority of states (eight out of thirteen) moved away from a
system of clemency vested solely in the executive. 46  Instead, states vested the clemency power in either the legislature or a
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combination of the legislature and the executive. 47  Thereafter, when the federal government began codifying the scope of its
powers, the two major plans--the New Jersey Plan and the Virginia Plan--failed to address the issue of clemency at all. 48
*64  When clemency was finally considered at the federal level, little contemplation was given to the prospect of following the
states' practice of limiting the executive clemency power or of placing the clemency power in the legislature, either solely or
jointly with the executive. 49  Instead, it was Alexander Hamilton's approach--which almost exactly mirrored the British model
as laid out in the Act of Settlement of 1701--that was adopted. 50  With Article II of the United States Constitution stating that
“[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.” 51
Founding Father Alexander Hamilton argued that adopting an executive-based clemency power would position clemency as a
defense against overbearing law, 52  much in the same vein as the founding spirit of the new Republic. 53  Specifically, Hamilton
noted that the ability to exercise clemency would ensure that citizens are treated fairly, as a rigid system of justice “would
wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.” 54  During the early years of the American clemency power, “justice-enhancing”
arguments, such as those proffered by Hamilton, were popularly cited at both the state and the federal levels as support for
vesting an unrestricted power so centrally. 55
Much like the clemency power in Ancient Rome and England, however, the true rationale behind such an uninhibited prerogative
was, in practice, primarily justice-neutral and premised on political expediency. 56  In light of the weakness of the new
Republic, the ability to exercise leniency for certain crimes was crucial; Hamilton *65  suggested that clemency could prove
essential to holding the Confederation together during “seasons of insurrection.” 57  As such, the early federal clemency power
was most frequently used to mitigate the effects of punishing popular rebellions, most notably during the Pennsylvanian
Whiskey Rebellion. 58  Similarly, Thomas Jefferson utilized the clemency power to pardon individuals whom the Federalists
had convicted and sentenced under the Alien Sedition Act in the years prior to their defeat in the election of 1800. 59
The largely political nature of the early clemency power is laid bare when examining the range of crimes pardoned by the first
four Presidents. Of Washington's thirty-one pardons, fifteen related to treason and six to violations of unpopular taxation. 60
Of Adams's twenty-five pardons, seventeen related to either insurrection or trade violations. 61  Between them, Jefferson
and Madison pardoned thirty-five individuals for desertion and forty-five for violations of revenue laws. 62  These pardons
demonstrate that clemency was a powerful political tool in the early years of the fledgling Republic, which used to soften the
fall-out from unpopular increases in federal taxation and the centralization of power. 63
As the executive-based federal clemency power was effectively utilized to hold the early Republic together, the “post-
independence Republican faith in legislative bodies soon waned.” 64  Consequentially, as state constitutions were ratified,
changes were made so as to move away from vesting the clemency power jointly in the legislature and the executive and toward
the federal approach, *66  which vested the clemency power solely in the executive. Of the first thirty-five state constitutions
ratified, twenty-six placed the clemency power in the hands of the Governor alone. 65
During this time, the clemency power--both the federal clemency power and the power vested in state governors--was rarely,
if ever, used to correct wrongful convictions that occurred against a non-political backdrop. 66  Seemingly, the strength of early
American clemency was its exercise contrary to justice: relieving law-breakers from their punishment while reinforcing that
the law was effective. 67
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Almost fifty years passed before the USSC considered the scope of the federal pardon power. In the 1833 case of United States
v. Wilson, the USSC considered whether President Jackson's pardon of a death sentence was valid against a robber who “did
not wish . . . to avail himself, in order to avoid [[the] sentence . . . .” 68  The case required the Justices to consider from where
the seemingly unfettered pardon power derived. 69  Due to scant legal discussion amongst American courts, Chief Justice John
Marshall sought guidance from English law and found that the presidential pardon was “an act of grace, proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of laws,” that should be interpreted widely and, to the extent possible, unregulated by law. 70
As such, the USSC refused to compel Wilson to accept the pardon and held that the presidential pardon was not valid as against
an unwilling recipient. 71
The breadth of the presidential pardon power was underscored in Ex Parte Garland, where the USSC found the power to
be “unlimited . . . . [A]nd may be exercised at any time . . . . This power *67  of the President is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of [the President's] pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.” 72
Furthermore, the USSC stated that the legislative inability to regulate the presidential pardon was a direct result of “the benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in [the President,] . . . [which] cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.” 73  Notably,
although the USSC addressed legislative interferences with clemency, judicial regulation was almost wholly ignored. 74  As
such, the question emerged whether such an uninhibited power could exist within a legal system without being subject to
judicial review.
2. The 20th Century Clemency Power
At the turn of the 20th Century, the clemency power began to interact more directly with the American criminal justice system.
This subsection will consider how this interaction occurred: first through clemency's utility to rehabilitative forms of justice,
and thereafter with its opposition to punitive justice. Finally, this section will consider how the USSC thrust clemency into the
forefront of the “era of innocence.”
a. Clemency and Rehabilitative Justice
The emergence of new forms of psychiatry and criminology at the start of the 20th Century meant that, for the first time, mercy
was no longer merely a political tool, but was actually a way of satisfying criminal justice policy. In addition to traditional
punitive measures, a strong emphasis was placed on rehabilitation. 75  This trend “unapologetically reject[ed] an act--and desert--
based conception of justice . . . and wholeheartedly embrace[d] leniency rooted in compassion.” 76  Compassionate justice aimed
at character reformation *68  became a central focus, 77  and the ability to grant pardons to rehabilitated individuals began
to be used as a tool in the administration of criminal justice. 78  At the state level, clemency recommendations and decisions
moved into the hands of official administrative boards. Additionally, many states, along with the federal government, enacted
indeterminate sentencing periods with wide ranging potential sentences, depending upon various factors. 79  There was a culture
change toward individualized, less punitive justice. 80
b. The Demise of Rehabilitative Justice and the Rise of “Tough on Crime” Agendas
In the 1970s, shortly after the clemency power moved into the mechanics of the criminal justice system, the rationale for its
criminal justice-related use eroded with the perceived failure of rehabilitative punishment. 81  Coupled with an increasingly
powerful voice of “victim advocacy,” 82  several widely reported incidents of “urban *69  disorder” in the wake of the
1965 Los Angeles Riots led to the replacement of rehabilitative theories of crime and punishment with populist “tough on
crime” initiatives. 83  This “tough on crime” approach culminated in the devastating effect of George H. W. Bush's now
infamous “Willie Horton” advertising campaign during the 1988 presidential election, which almost single-handedly changed
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the outcome of the presidential race. 84  Even today, political candidates viewed as “soft on crime” are, in many places,
considered unelectable. 85
As part of this return to punitive justice, legislatures across America began enacting strict mandatory sentencing guidelines for
a large range of crimes. 86  Against this backdrop, the general consensus was that the excessive use of clemency, a traditionally
executive act, had the potential to blur the separation of powers. Specifically, it was felt that the exercise of clemency pitted this
residual executive power against the will of a democratically elected legislature, which had enacted mandatory sentences. 87
For the first time, the use of clemency actively weakened the position of the executive.
At the state level, several governors found their exercise of clemency being successfully used against them in subsequent
election campaigns. 88  To this day, even within typically liberal-aligned states, the use of clemency is considered a political
minefield. For example, although New York Governor Andrew Cuomo had been an outspoken proponent of clemency prior to
being elected, it took him over three *70  years to grant his first and, to date, only pardon. 89  At the federal level, the appearance
of executive overreach into the courts and legislature was even more damaging in light of the “small government” 90  framework
emphasized by successive presidents since Nixon's “New Federalism.” 91  Raymond Theim, the Deputy Pardon Attorney to
three Republican presidents, including Reagan and George H. W. Bush, summed up the feeling toward the use of clemency
when he was in office:
The feeling is that we should do as little as possible to grant relief. . . . It's a dangerous trend for the executive
to override the function of the Courts and the parole system too much, both from the point of view of the
balance of power and of possible corruption. . . . Clemency is bestowed as an act of grace and not as a
matter of right. 92
*71  Evidencing the implementation of this view, restrictions on clemency applications were employed during both the Reagan
and Bush Senior Administrations. For example, the Reagan Administration tightened the rules surrounding applications for
clemency. 93  As a result of these restrictions, the number of clemency applications fell dramatically during both of Reagan's
terms in the White House--a trend that has continued. 94  Moreover, grants of clemency dropped from approximately eighteen
percent under President Nixon to just four percent under President George H. W. Bush. 95  Most recently, President Obama has
been criticized for his unwillingness to utilize the presidential pardon. 96
As such, although it was a trend towards merciful punishment that originally transformed the clemency power from a political
tool to a familiar feature of the criminal justice system, this concept of mercy has become the weakest point of the clemency
power within the modern justice framework. Considering this, it is unfortunate that the USSC decided to thrust clemency into
the heart of the criminal justice system at a time when the exercise of clemency had become such a politically unfavorable act. 97
3. Clemency's Introduction to the Era of Innocence
In the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins, the USSC placed great confidence in the clemency function by labeling it the “fail safe”
of the criminal justice system. 98
Herrera had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in January 1982. 99  The evidence against him included
two *72  eyewitnesses, circumstantial evidence, and a handwritten letter in which Herrera impliedly admitted his guilt. 100  In
subsequent proceedings, Herrera claimed his deceased brother had committed the murders. 101  Herrera's actual innocence claim
was supported by: affidavits from Herrera's cell-mate, school friend, and brother's attorney, all of who claimed that Herrera's
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brother had confessed to having committed the murders; 102  and an affidavit from Herrera's nephew, who claimed to have
witnessed his father carrying out the murders. 103  Despite this evidence, the USSC held that Herrera's claim of actual innocence
(absent some other procedural violation in his case) was not a ground for federal habeas relief. 104  Rather, the Court reasoned:
(1) clemency was the “fail safe” of the criminal justice system; 105  (2) state clemency processes are the proper mechanism for
assessing innocence claims; 106  and (3) clemency had been the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where
the judicial process had been exhausted. 107
Therefore, clemency is the final check on whether the entire legal system has failed. This section, however, challenges the
USSC's account of clemency historically playing a key role in correcting wrongful convictions. Rather, political expediency
appears to be the traditional, primary function of clemency. 108  Considering this, Part II explores the extent to which current
state clemency frameworks cater to the “innocence role” afforded clemency.
*73  II. A REVIEW OF STATE CLEMENCY FRAMEWORKS
The application of the clemency power differs from state to state. Thirteen states give the Governor the sole power to preside
over clemency decisions. 109  In five states, an administrative board solely determines clemency decisions. 110  In other states,
the Governor and an administrative board share the clemency power. 111  Most states have established administrative boards that
can make non-binding clemency recommendations to the Governor. 112  In eight states, these recommendations are mandatory
procedure, and the Board must provide the Governor with a recommendation before he or she can act. 113  This non-uniformity
is largely due to a lack of “statutory or administrative standards governing use of the power.” 114  Thus, as one commentator
explains, “each governor has different ideas about the function of executive clemency and . . . the rate of granting clemency
varies dramatically . . . from state to state.” 115
In addition to highlighting the differences in the design of clemency frameworks, 116  a review of state clemency procedures
reveals a number of obstacles that may hinder innocents' abilities to successfully navigate the clemency process. These obstacles
fall into three broad categories: (1) transparency issues; (2) imbalanced administrative board compositions; and (3) barriers to
meaningful review. Although many of these issues apply to guilty inmates seeking clemency, they are exacerbated in the cases
of innocent inmates attempting to utilize clemency to seek relief.
*74  A. Transparency Issues
A review of state clemency frameworks reveals a number of transparency issues unfavorable to innocents. These issues include
a lack of published reasoning for clemency decisions, selective transparency, and expansive confidentiality rules. Each issue
will be considered in turn.
1. Lack of Published Reasoning
There is general lack of reasoning provided by executives and administrative bodies determining clemency applications. For
example, Indiana and Nevada do not require the Governor to justify any clemency decision by providing his or her rationale. 117
Similarly, in Idaho, the Commission of Pardons and Paroles publishes a list of clemency decisions on its website, but does
not embellish it with detailed reasons. 118  The same is true in Oklahoma, 119  Utah, 120  and Texas. 121  In New Jersey, the
Governor must provide the state legislature with a written report about the clemency applications he *75  grants, but there is no
equivalent requirement for those he denies. 122  The procedure is the same in New York 123  and Oregon. 124  Notwithstanding
this requirement, reports from the Oregon Governor include only a minimal offering of reasons for his grants of clemency. 125
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The procedures in Utah facially appear to provide for greater transparency because state rules dictate that the Board of Pardons
and Paroles' decisions--made following public hearings--be public documents; the Board “may publish its decisions on its
website or other forum or in other forms, at its discretion and convenience.” 126  These decisions and any accompanying reasons
are not substantive, however, and the appearance of transparency fades in application. 127
In states where the clemency power is shared between an administrative board and the Governor, the executive can ignore board
recommendations; this is the case even in states that require administrative boards to provide the reasons behind clemency
decisions or that make clemency decisions public documents. In Washington, for example, hearings before the Clemency and
Pardons Board are public--as are the deliberations of the Board members. 128  As part of this process, each Board member
must vote and explain the rationale behind his or her decision. 129  However, as is the case with *76  most administrative
board recommendations, rationales provided may be ignored by the Washington Governor. 130  Arizona has a similar facility
for its Board of Executive Clemency. Although the Board does not necessarily have to provide extensive reasons in its public
hearings, it may provide a lengthy letter of recommendation to the Governor. 131  Again, however, the Board's recommendations
are not binding. 132  Notably, there are numerous states, including Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Texas, that employ a system whereby the board must give a recommendation before the Governor can act--
regardless of whether he or she acts in accordance with the recommendation. 133  To date, however, it appears that no state has
established binding administrative board recommendations. 134
2. Selective Transparency
As evidenced above, where there is transparency, it is sometimes selective and unfavorable to applicants. Similar to clemency
procedures in New Jersey, New York, and Oregon, which only provide some level of transparency to clemency grants (but
not to *77  clemency denials), Louisiana and South Carolina also apply selective transparency rules unfavorable to clemency
applicants. 135
In Louisiana, all letters submitted in favor of a clemency applicant are subject to public inspection, whereas letters from victims
and victims' representatives are not. 136  In effect, an innocent inmate in Louisiana is unable to challenge the rationale advanced
in the letter of an alleged victim opposing his or her clemency application. Letters and statements in support of, or in opposition
to, clemency may vary, but they can be significant. Generally, an inmate's family and friends may write to demonstrate that the
inmate has a support network outside of prison; counselors may submit a letter to provide details about an inmate's temperament
or work and education programs the inmate has completed while in prison. Victims may make statements about the long-
term impacts of the crime for which the applicant was convicted. Sentencing judges may also write because they feel the
mandatory sentence they were legally bound to impose was too harsh and deserves correction. In the context of innocence
claims, jurors at the clemency applicant's trial may write to say that, in light of new evidence, they would not vote for a guilty
verdict; eyewitnesses or “snitches” may recant their trial testimony; and experts may submit statements to support clemency
applications. As such, Louisiana's selective procedures may disadvantage an innocent inmate by preventing him or her from
challenging--or, at least, fully challenging-- arguments presented against his or her clemency application. By contrast, the State
will be advantaged by full access to all materials in support of and in opposition to the inmate's application.
In South Carolina, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, which makes decisions in non-capital cases, is mandated to publish
accountability reports; however, these reports are merely business or core values reports, 137  which add very little to the
substantive transparency of decision-making in the state clemency process. As *78  aforementioned, other states, such as
Idaho, 138  Oklahoma, 139  Utah, 140  and Texas, 141  provide statistics or other brief information about clemency decisions, but,
again, nothing substantive. Although these examples give the appearance of transparency, they are, in reality, quite shallow
when it comes to shedding light on the rationale behind clemency decisions.
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3. Lack of Records and Expansive Confidentiality Rules
A general lack of record-keeping and the expansive confidentiality rules governing clemency proceedings also result in a lack of
transparency. For example: New Mexico has no particular record keeping processes in place; 142  the Mississippi Constitution
does not expressly require that records on decision-making processes be kept; 143  in Vermont, the Parole Board holds public
hearings, but board member deliberations are not recorded; 144  and in Ohio, Clemency Reports--which cover the particulars
of an applicant's case, but are only sometimes completed by Parole Board Parole Officers--are confidential. 145  Texas also has
an expansive confidentiality regime, where six categories of information are considered confidential in the event an inmate
seeks clemency: Department of Public Safety records; *79  criminal history information; execution summaries and prison
records; recommendations from trial officials; letters from victims and supporters; letters from inmate and supporters; and
general correspondence from the public. 146
The rationale for confidentiality is legitimate: to protect the privacy of applicants and victims and to encourage “frank and
open decision-making” by shielding the deliberative processes of decision-makers from overbearing scrutiny. 147  However,
confidentiality rules may avert public scrutiny of exculpatory issues and thereby prevent innocents from being identified or
hinder their ability to challenge the case against them. For example, in 2010, a journalist in Texas wanted to examine documents
related to the clemency application of death-row inmate Hank Skinner after it came to light that there was DNA evidence in his
case that, if tested, could possibly exonerate him. 148  The Texas Board of Pardons and Parole rejected the journalist's request
for “correspondence, documents and reports” related to the Skinner case because nearly all such information was deemed to
be confidential. 149
Transparency is an important factor in clemency proceedings because it interlinks with a bundle of other important, justice-
related concepts. According to Leona D. Jochnowitz:
[T]he question of public access to state . . . clemency petitions is emblematic of important issues regarding the fairness, standards,
effectiveness, flexibility and diversity of the various clemency *80  procedures. It also is related to the question of who controls,
monitors and historically preserves the records depicting the unbridled discretion associated with the clemency process. 150
Additionally, transparency can reveal injustice. This is why Kathleen Dean Moore argues that clemency decisions should be
made on a “basis of reason,” which is then made public. 151  Moore asserts that public scrutiny allows for an assessment of
whether a clemency decision is “principled, reasonable and fair.” 152  “Sunshine is thus an antiseptic.” 153
Veiled decision-making, selective transparency, and expansive confidentiality regimes expose the clemency process to potential
abuse. As previously noted, many states shield clemency decisions and, more importantly, the reasoning underpinning those
decisions from the full light of day. A number of states--such as Arizona, 154  Maryland, 155  Utah, 156  Nebraska, 157  and
Washington 158 --do, however, conduct clemency hearings in a public setting, providing significant transparency for credible
innocence claims to be aired and identified. 159
Finally, the rationale behind confidentiality rules can conflict with “transparency needs,” especially with regard to protecting
recommendations to deny clemency and victim statements. 160  As a result of these transparency issues, it is possible that the
rejection of clemency applications based on credible innocence claims may never *81  be identified, let alone corrected, and
clemency is therefore hindered in its role as a “tool of corrective justice.” 161
B. Imbalanced Administrative Board Compositions
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Administrative boards play a significant role in the vast majority of state clemency proceedings; therefore, the composition of
these boards is crucial to the assessment of innocence claims.
In order to encourage balanced, collaborative dialogues about how the risk of wrongful convictions can be reduced, American
innocence commissions have brought together representatives from across the criminal justice system, including prosecutors,
defense attorneys, victims' rights advocates, politicians, scientists, and academics. 162  This collaboration brings “usually
autonomous actors . . . together to encourage change.” 163  Rachel Barkow argues that such diversity is equally important when
it comes to administrative boards involved in clemency processes, because diverse administrative boards can add expediency,
political cover, and legitimacy to a grant of clemency. 164  Barkow asserts that clemency boards should “not be mere arms of
law enforcement interests, for that could skew them . . . against issuing any grants at all.” 165  Instead, clemency boards should
be “careful to mix law enforcement interests with those of defense lawyers and former offenders so that each side can learn
from the other and increase the likelihood that sound conclusions will be reached and less subject to political attack.” 166  In the
context of innocence, *82  a diverse board may also mean that innocence claims will glean a more balanced review.
Administrative boards in some states do reflect a degree of diversity. For example, the Kentucky Board brings together members
from legal, investigative, teaching, medicine, corrections, and social work backgrounds. 167  Ohio's Board is comprised of
members with varying experience in victims' rights, rehabilitation and corrections, and law. 168  The Pennsylvania Board
integrates members with experience in offender mentoring, specialized courts, corrections, law enforcement, parole, medical
technology, science, and law, including criminal defense. 169  South Carolina's Board includes individuals with backgrounds
in religious practice, administration, parole, probation, social work, nursing, pharmaceuticals, management, realty, automotive
brokering, personal training, teaching, and military service. 170  The Board in South Carolina is, however, nearly devoid
of members aligned with the criminal defense community and, instead, consists mostly of individuals aligned with state
prosecutorial services or organizations. 171
Other administrative boards are more overtly state aligned. For instance, the Nebraska Board of Pardons is comprised of the
Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. 172  Colorado requires that its Board include the Executive Director
of the Department of Corrections, the Executive Director of the Department of Public Safety, and at least one person who
is a crime victim (or suitable representative) in its membership; 173  there is no requirement *83  that the Board include any
defense-orientated members. 174  In Nevada, the Board of Pardons is comprised of the Governor, the Attorney General, and the
seven Nevada State Supreme Court Justices, 175  the majority of whom have backgrounds in complex civil law; in fact, only
three of the Justices have any experience in criminal law, 176  and, of those, only one has a background, albeit a minimal one,
in criminal defense--having spent one year working with the Public Defender's Office. 177  The Utah Board of Pardons and
Parole has eight members, of whom seven have backgrounds in state organizations, including: the District Attorney's Office,
the Department of Corrections, the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, Homeland Defense and Security, and
the Attorney General's Office. 178
The inclusion of board members from state aligned organizations, however, is not wholly unfavorable. As Barkow states, it is
important to “include groups most likely to oppose such [clemency] grants” 179  because involving such representatives “is a
critical means of muting any subsequent criticism” 180  of a decision to grant clemency. The issue, then, is the extent to which
state aligned representatives eclipse those from the criminal defense and inmate communities. Unfortunately, a survey of recent
state clemency boards reveals a distinct lack of diversity in board composition. Clemency boards *84  devoid of representation
by individuals (such as lawyers, academics, and scientists) with a working knowledge of post-conviction review, state evidence
and innocence rules, and the causes of wrongful convictions are problematic for a balanced assessment of innocence claims.
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C. Barriers to Meaningful Review
As clemency has been saddled with the responsibility of serving as the final adjudicator of innocence claims, one scholar argues
“[t]o serve properly . . . as a safeguard, it is essential that the clemency power be checked, so as to require, at the very least, that
all applications for clemency are meaningfully reviewed.” 181  There are numerous potential barriers to the meaningful review
of clemency applications, particularly for innocents, including: (1) high thresholds for eligibility and relief and antipathetic
attitudes; (2) obstacles to the evaluation of claims; and (3) a lack of specific innocence procedures.
1. High Thresholds and Antipathetic State Attitudes Toward Granting Clemency
High thresholds operate to restrict or foreclose the opportunities for an inmate's clemency application to be heard. State
clemency frameworks generally employ two particularly high thresholds: eligibility requirements and requirements for relief.
Additionally, evidence indicates that decision-makers are generally hostile toward granting clemency. This subsection considers
these thresholds and attitudes.
a. Eligibility Thresholds
Numerous states employ high eligibility thresholds for clemency. Some states, for example, require a payment to access the
clemency system. In Pennsylvania, an inmate must pay $8 for a clemency *85  application form. 182  Other states employ
a more typical, robust eligibility threshold. Among them, Indiana requires inmates to serve a third of their sentence before
applying for clemency; 183  Connecticut requires inmates to serve four years if their original sentence exceeds eight years and
half of the original sentence if the original sentence is less than eight years; 184  and Colorado requires inmates to serve one
third or ten years of their sentence, whichever is less. 185  In Georgia, state law does not dictate a minimum number of years be
served before applying for clemency; rather, there is a general requirement that an inmate serve at least one-third of his or her
sentence. 186  Requirements like these are patently problematic for innocents because they eliminate a mechanism for relief for
substantial amounts of time, often without special consideration of credible innocence claims.
Other states employ strict disqualification criteria. In Indiana, for example, any inmate whose institutional record reflects one
major violation or two or more minor violations in the last year is precluded from applying for clemency. 187  Comparably,
Virginia requires that an applicant not have pleaded guilty to be eligible to apply for clemency; 188  this prerequisite is
particularly troublesome given that *86  research shows numerous DNA exonerees originally pleaded guilty to a crime they
did not commit. 189
b. Relief Thresholds
Some states employ high thresholds for clemency relief. Applicants in Connecticut, for example, must “describe and submit
evidence of specific extraordinary circumstances or specific exemplary conduct supporting the request for clemency;” 190
however, what constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” is not defined. In Wisconsin, applicants must show that the need for
clemency is “significant and documented.” 191  Washington also requires “extraordinary circumstances” to grant clemency. 192
The list of factors considered by the Washington Board when determining if an application is sufficiently “extraordinary” to
warrant relief does not expressly include innocence or dubious guilt. 193  In contrast, the factors considered by the Board of
Pardons in South Dakota do expressly include (1) substantial evidence indicating one's sentence was a miscarriage of justice
and (2) proven innocence by clear and convincing evidence. 194  The Montana Board of Pardons and Paroles also considers
whether an inmate petitioning for clemency can *87  “satisfactorily prove innocence of a crime” for which he or she is serving
or has served a sentence. 195
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High relief thresholds are a hallmark of the American post-conviction relief arena. 196  This is likely because employing high
relief thresholds is a means of ensuring finality, which is one of the American criminal justice system's greatest obsessions. 197
Given the clemency system's relationship with the criminal justice system, it is unsurprising to find the application of rules
that largely preserve trial verdicts, thus supporting the system's general allegiance to finality. Accordingly, clemency boards
and executives avoid unraveling jury verdicts, 198  despite their responsibility to do so when a case warrants such action, i.e.,
in cases involving credible innocence claims. 199
c. Antipathetic State Attitudes
As well as employing high eligibility and relief thresholds, numerous states underscore that a grant of clemency, especially
one grounded in innocence, is rare. Moreover, some states give the impression they are unwelcoming of such applications. For
example, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles states in its annual report that a grant of clemency based on “complete
innocence” is “most rare,” 200  and highlights that only two such pardons have been granted since 1943. 201  In Virginia, it is
emphasized that an “absolute pardon,” which is a pardon based on the belief that a petitioner is innocent and *88  was unjustly
convicted, is “rarely granted.” 202  The general information section of Wisconsin's application for clemency advises that “[e]
xecutive clemency is an extraordinary measure and is rarely granted.” 203  The point is bolded and underlined. 204
Collectively, these thresholds and projected antipathetic attitudes are unfavorable to innocent inmates because they tightly
restrict the timeframe in which an inmate can apply for clemency, set a high bar for relief, and discourage inmates from
applying. Requiring an innocent inmate to serve a third of his or her sentence before applying for clemency, for example,
hardly comports with notions of justice. Additionally, many innocent inmates lack the “clear and convincing” evidence of
innocence or “extraordinary circumstances” required for relief. One way to satisfy this “clear and convincing” standard is by
presenting DNA evidence; however, only between 5% and 10% of criminal cases involve DNA evidence, 205  and, even when
such evidence exists, inmates often face issues gaining access to and testing it. 206  Innocence cases often confront a hodgepodge
of other problems, such as false confessions, erroneous eyewitness identifications, jailhouse snitches, State misconduct,
ineffective lawyering, and unreliable forensic evidence. 207  Such obstacles are exacerbated by clemency procedures and
attitudes unfavorable to innocent inmates.
2. Obstacles to the Evaluation of Claims
There are numerous junctures of the review process of clemency applications that are potentially unfavorable to innocents.
First, many states' clemency application forms are designed without a focus on innocence, failing to include specific questions
about innocence or the *89  potential causes of a wrongful conviction. 208  This is not true in all states, however. Some states'
applications include a space where applicants can provide their version of events. For example, the Illinois application asks
applicants to “provide [[their] own version of the factual circumstances of the offense(s).” 209  Additionally, some states, like
Illinois and Arizona, allow applicants to file supplementary documentation to support their applications. 210
Second, the investigation of claims raised in clemency applications can be troublesome. Some states, including Oklahoma and
Nebraska, indicate that clemency claims are investigated without clarifying the form or the extent of the investigations. 211
Missouri provides slightly more information, stating that the Board may investigate information ranging from criminal history
and medical needs to statements from relevant lawyers, judges, and victims. 212  The issue of investigation of claims links with
the transparency concerns identified above; a lack of information regarding the depth to *90  which clemency applications and
innocence claims are investigated may allow abuse of process. 213
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Third, although numerous states offer hearings to expand upon the claims set out in clemency applications, sometimes this
mechanism is underutilized or is inadequate to facilitate innocence claims. In Washington and Nebraska, hearings are only
provided after a preliminary decision is made that the application has merit; 214  however, the meaning of “merit” is unclear.
Even if a hearing is granted in Nebraska, “[i]t is not . . . the purpose of the hearing to retry the case or determine guilt
or innocence.” 215  Similarly, in Washington, “the hearing is not a forum to retry the conviction.” 216  In Ohio, hearings
are discretionary. 217  Pennsylvania 218  and Utah 219  have typical hearing time requirements of fifteen and twenty minutes,
respectively. By contrast, other states, like Georgia 220  and Arizona, 221  permit hearings to span many hours.
*91  During the clemency application review process, applicants are faced with obstacles potentially unfavorable to innocents.
These obstacles, such as restricted clemency application forms, undefined investigations, and limited hearings, reduce the
likelihood that innocence claims will be effectively examined and evaluated by administrative boards and executives.
3. Lack of Specific Innocence Procedures
As noted, clemency was not originally developed to assess innocence claims; 222  rather, an innocence role was thrust upon it
by the USSC in Herrera. This sub-section considers the extent to which states have remodeled (or, indeed, failed to remodel)
their clemency frameworks to account for its innocence role.
a. Innocence and Extraordinary Circumstances Procedures
Numerous states employ special clemency procedures for extraordinary circumstances, which aim to streamline the application
process. However, such procedures often fail to cater to innocence claims by routinely omitting actual innocence from the
list of extraordinary circumstances considered. In West Virginia, for example, “an inmate, parolee, or probationer must have
contributed extraordinary service to his penal institution, exhibited extraordinary motivation toward his rehabilitation, or . . .
suffer[ed] an extreme[,] life-threatening medical condition that has been certified by prison medical staff in order to be
eligible to apply for a pardon.” 223  Arizona's special procedures only cover applicants in “imminent danger of death,” in a
permanent vegetative state, or pending execution. 224  The Utah Board of Pardons may, in exceptional circumstances, adjust its
prior decisions through a special-attention review or hearing; 225  in Utah, exceptional circumstances include illness requiring
extensive medical attention, exceptional performance *92  or progress in prison, exceptional family circumstances, a verified
opportunity for employment, or information that was not previously considered by the Board. 226  Although this list is not
exhaustive and, arguably, “information not previously considered by the Board” could include evidence of innocence, innocence
is not specifically highlighted. 227  States' failure to identify innocence as an extraordinary circumstance is just one example of
how states have failed to remodel their clemency frameworks to account for clemency's post-Herrera innocence role.
b. General References to Innocence
There are states, however, that do reference innocence as part of their clemency processes. For instance, New York considers
pardons when no other adequate administrative or legal remedy is available and when there is “overwhelming and convincing
proof of innocence not available at the time of conviction.” 228  Pardons are available in Georgia in two specific instances, one
of which is “complete innocence;” 229  the administrative board in Georgia “ha[s] the authority to pardon any person convicted
of a crime who is subsequently determined to be innocent of said crime.” 230  In Alabama, persons under sentence who have not
yet completed three years of successful parole may apply for a pardon based on innocence, but this process requires approval
from the sentencing court or prosecuting District Attorney. 231  In Louisiana, applicants with a life sentence may bypass the
fifteen-year service rule and apply for clemency when they have *93  sufficient evidence to show they would not have been
found guilty if the new evidence had been introduced at trial. 232
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c. Innocence Specific Procedures
Some states have carved out specific clemency procedures that focus on innocence claims. In Montana, for example, pardons
may be granted for applicants who “satisfactorily prove innocence of a crime for which the individual has served time” 233
or who “submit[] newly discovered evidence showing complete justification or non-guilt on the part of the individual.” 234
Additionally, applicants in Montana who prove “by overwhelming evidence that the individual is innocent of a crime for which
the individual was convicted” can be recommended for commutation. 235  In North Carolina, a “pardon of innocence” is granted
either when an individual has been convicted and the criminal charges are subsequently dismissed or when the individual
has been erroneously convicted, imprisoned, and later found innocent. 236  Tennessee utilizes a clemency “exoneration”
procedure, 237  through which the Governor gives serious deliberation to applications that demonstrate, by clear and convincing
evidence, “after consideration of the facts, circumstances and any newly discovered evidence [[that] the Petitioner did not
commit the crime for *94  which the Petitioner was convicted.” 238  Clark McMillan and James Green were both exonerated
by Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen through this procedure. In McMillan's case, DNA evidence proved he was innocent
of a rape and robbery for which he had spent twenty-two years in prison. 239  Green was pardoned, after serving two years
for the abduction and groping of a child, after the victim recanted her testimony and the District Attorney dropped the
charges. 240  Texas also specifically allows for pardons based on innocence, which exonerate the applicant and erase his or her
conviction(s). 241  “In order to consider a pardon for innocence, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles requires either evidence
of actual innocence from at least two trial officials; or the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the district judge in a
state habeas action indicating actual innocence.” 242
Alyson Dinsmore argues that clemency, in its current form, “is an inadequate means of protecting against wrongful executions,”
labeling it a “meaningless ritual.” 243  While it is apparent that innocent inmates face a plethora of obstacles during their quest
for relief via clemency, it is also evident that some states have taken a measure of positive action. Still, states have not yet
adopted a consistent approach to building clemency frameworks that satisfy their responsibilities under Herrera --to be the “fail
safe” of the criminal justice system and the final identifier of wrongful convictions--in a meaningful way.
Whether the result of legal mandates or the preference of individual executives, innocence-specific procedures generally arise
only after the legal system has relieved a defendant. Consequently, *95  the extent to which clemency practices and decisions
can be judicially reviewed is crucial.
III. AMERICAN COURTS' RESPONSES TO DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO CLEMENCY FRAMEWORKS
Five years after Herrera, 244  the USSC considered whether clemency was an “integral” part of Ohio's system for adjudicating
guilt or innocence and, therefore, deserving of due process protection. 245  Rejecting the Petitioner's claims--and seemingly
sidelining its decision in Herrera--the USSC determined that clemency proceedings “are not part of the trial or even of the
adjudicatory process.” 246  The Court explained that clemency proceedings “do not determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, and are not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial process.” 247  In so holding, the USSC affirmed
that clemency decisions were not the “business of the courts.” 248
The Court split, however, with regard to whether procedural due process rights attach to clemency proceedings. 249  Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, concluded that the Due Process Clause provides no
constitutional safeguards as to clemency procedures. 250  Justice O'Connor, however, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Souter, concluded that, because a death row prisoner retains some life interest before execution, “some minimal procedural
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings,” even if the power to grant clemency is solely entrusted to the executive. 251  Justice
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O'Connor reasoned that judicial intervention might be “warranted in the face of a scheme whereby the state official flipped a coin
to determine whether to grant clemency or in a case where the state arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its *96  clemency
process.” 252  Justice Stevens concurred, arguing that it would be wrong for clemency processes “infected by bribery, personal or
political animosity, or the deliberate fabrication of false evidence” to be constitutionally acceptable. 253  Subsequently, the vast
majority of courts have interpreted Woodard to mean that minimal due process protections extend beyond clemency applications
arising out of death penalty cases and attach to all clemency proceedings. There is no agreement, however, on what exactly
constitutes “minimal” due process in the context of clemency proceedings. Since Woodard, defendants have made a variety
of due process challenges in relation to state clemency frameworks. These have included: (A) innocence related challenges;
(B) challenges related to the provision of assistance for preparing clemency applications; (C) challenges to state clemency
procedures; and (D) challenges related to the role or conduct of state officials. This section provides a brief overview of courts'
responses to such claims.
A. Innocence Related Challenges
Some inmates have challenged clemency proceedings by way of arguments related to their claim of innocence. In Corliss v.
Pennsylvania Board of Pardons & Parole, Corliss challenged the Board's decision to deny him parole, alleging that, in light
of exculpatory DNA evidence, the denial violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 254  The court rejected his
claim, stating *97  that Corliss presented no basis for his conclusion that DNA evidence proved his innocence; 255  the fact that
the trial court properly rejected the DNA evidence as inconclusive illustrated that Corliss's claim lacked merit. 256  However,
deference to trial court findings concerning exculpatory evidence can be problematic. As one commentator states:
Exaggerating the weaknesses of a prisoner's exculpatory evidence not only undermines the integrity of the
judicial process, but it may also make it more difficult for the prisoner to obtain clemency. Once a court
declares that the . . . standard [for review] has not been met, a governor fearful of controversy may find it
irresistibly tempting to take cover behind the court's declaration and say that he or she, like the court, finds
the prisoner's exculpatory evidence unconvincing. It certainly would not be the first time that a governor
presented with a difficult clemency petition has sought shelter behind a court's refusal to grant the prisoner's
request for relief. 257
In 2008, the court in McKithen v. Brown engaged in possibly the most protracted discussion of any court regarding innocence
claims and clemency proceedings. 258  McKithen, who had been convicted of the attempted murder of his wife, petitioned
the court for access to DNA testing of a knife that might exonerate him. 259  One question the court considered was whether
McKithen's liberty interest in meaningful access to existing executive clemency mechanisms encompassed access to the knife
introduced as evidence against him at trial. 260  Judge John Gleeson of the United States District Court, referring to Herrera's
description of clemency as a “fail safe,” held:
[There is] strong support for my conclusion that the right of meaningful access to existing clemency mechanisms entails the right
to certain evidence of innocence. Though clemency  *98  proceedings are not exclusively or even primarily “error-correction”
proceedings, and often turn not on a revisitation of the facts underlying a conviction, but on an analysis of a defendant's contrition
and personality, they nevertheless have one significant, even if discretionary, error-correcting function: they are the last resort
for the wrongfully convicted. 261
Judge Gleeson concluded that the criminal justice system continues to “grapple with the questions of which avenues of relief
remain open to those advancing claims that they are wrongfully convicted.” 262  He noted that while some states offer statutory
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mechanisms to set aside convictions based on newly discovered evidence, it was unclear whether there was a constitutional
right to do so. 263  Therefore, Judge Gleeson reasoned:
The remaining resort for the innocent convicted is to avail themselves of the opportunity to petition for
clemency in whatever form the state has authorized. States may debate the value of expanding or contracting
any of these avenues; in light of the tremendous probative power of DNA evidence, it may be wise to strike
a different balance between accuracy and finality in cases where it is available. 264
In spite of Judge Gleeson's detailed assessment, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the decision in 2010. 265
Although acknowledging that the district court paid “careful attention to precedent” and employed a “quality of . . . reasoning,
which proved to be intricate and, in many ways, persuasive,” the circuit court found *99  McKithen had no residual due process
liberty interest in meaningful access to state clemency mechanisms. 266  In so holding, the circuit court relied heavily on the
USSC's 2009 decision in District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), 267  which raised similar issues. There, the
USSC found that a prisoner had no liberty interest with respect to “any procedures available to vindicate an interest in state
clemency,” explaining that clemency is “inherently discretionary and subject to the whim, or grace, of the decision-maker; it
is, in other words, a form of relief to which a prisoner has no right.” 268  As such, the circuit court in McKithen explained:
Because there is no liberty interest in receiving clemency, the Osborne Court rejected the existence of any
subsidiary liberty interest regarding the adequacy of state procedures capable of granting that relief. Thus,
the District Court's holding that a prisoner has a liberty interest in meaningful access to state clemency
mechanisms does not survive Osborne. 269
These cases demonstrate that the relationship between clemency and innocence has crept into legal challenges. The district
court's decision in McKithen, and to some extent the circuit court's acknowledgement of its persuasiveness despite overruling it,
demonstrates a glimmer of understanding that the courts should (albeit that they cannot or will not) intervene where clemency
or legal frameworks do not facilitate access to unimpeachable evidence of innocence, such as DNA evidence. However, Corliss,
the circuit court's decision in McKithen, and the USSC's decision in Osborne  *100  undermine this point and further the legal
system's general allegiance to finality over accuracy 270  by encouraging clemency boards to defer to trial court determinations
and foreclosing the notion that defendants have a liberty interest in meaningful access to clemency. Moreover, these decisions
demonstrate the general resistance to claims concerning access to exculpatory evidence.
Although the following cases do not relate specifically to innocence claims, they further demonstrate how narrowly Woodard's
minimal due process standard is applied and illustrate courts' unwillingness to interfere in state clemency proceedings. This
lack of judicial oversight allows for even the most suspect clemency proceedings to pass constitutional muster and potentially
shields the inadequate examination of innocence claims in state clemency proceedings.
B. Challenges Related to the Provision of Assistance for Preparing Clemency Applications
Some inmates have argued that minimal due process requires they be provided with a certain level of assistance when preparing
clemency applications. For example, in the 2006 case Lewis v. State of Alaska, Lewis argued that due process required the State
provide her with an examination by a private doctor whose report she could use to support her application for clemency. 271
The Alaska Supreme Court assumed that Lewis had a “significant interest” in the ability to generate information to support her
clemency application and that the State's denial could have the effect of denying her access to “potentially important relief.” 272
However, because Lewis had not “demonstrated any real-world value of gaining access to a private doctor,” the court found
there was no denial of due process and rejected Lewis's claims. 273  The court stated, “Lewis did not attempt to rely on any
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readily available information to make out a showing *101  suggesting that she has a medical condition that might justify
clemency” or might qualify as an “exceptional circumstance.” 274
In Baze v. Parker, Baze, a death row inmate, challenged the Kentucky Department's denial of his unfettered access to prison
personnel. Baze had sought a court order permitting him to interview prison staff whom he thought could support his application
for clemency. 275  Regarding the propriety of such an order, Baze argued that federal courts have the power to order third-party
compliance with clemency related investigations. 276  The Sixth Circuit found that “[s]uch a broad oversight power is in tension
with the longstanding principle that we do not sit as super appeals courts over state commutation proceedings.” 277  In response
to Baze's argument that meaningful access to clemency included a right to call upon federal courts to supervise the mechanics
of state proceedings, the court bluntly stated, “we cannot infer a Congressional intent to interfere with state proceedings to such
a remarkable extent.” 278
Courts' unwillingness to compel states to actively facilitate the preparation of clemency applications emphasizes the uninhibited
nature of the clemency power. Moreover, courts appear generally unwilling to interfere with state clemency procedures,
whether or not the clemency application is based on a claim of innocence. Although Lewis and Baze are not innocence cases,
presumably, courts would similarly approach claims advanced by innocent inmates in cases where states have refused to assist
innocents in gathering evidence typically utilized to challenge a conviction, such as lay witness or expert testimony and forensic
evidence. Of course, courts could retreat from the current precedent and expand the district court's approach in McKithen beyond
unimpeachable DNA evidence. However, as attractive as such a change in direction would be, it is unlikely; this is because
McKithen's holding was, in effect, very narrow, given that only five to ten percent of cases involve DNA evidence. 279
*102  C. Challenges to State Clemency Procedures
Another argument inmates have advanced is that state clemency procedures are not in compliance with Woodard's minimal due
process standard. In Faulder v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles, Faulder claimed the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles
violated due process by providing inadequate notice of issues it would consider for clemency, acting in secrecy, refusing to hold
hearings, giving no reasons for its decisions, and failing to keep records of its actions. 280  The Fifth Circuit labeled Faulder's
latter claims regarding transparency “meritless.” Interpreting narrowly Justice O'Connor's view in Woodard regarding when
judicial intervention is warranted, the court explained that Woodard's “low threshold of judicial reviewability is based on the
facts that pardon and commutation decisions are not traditionally the business of courts and that they are subject to the ultimate
discretion of the executive power.” 281  The court found that Texas clemency procedures did not exhibit the “extreme” nature of
a coin toss or arbitrary denial of access to the clemency process, and thus satisfied Woodard's minimal due process standard. 282
In conclusion, the court noted, “[p]rocedural due process is an inherently flexible concept. And Woodard emphasizes that extra
flexibility is required when, as here, the criminal process has reached an end and a highly individualized and merciful decision
like executive clemency is at issue.” 283
Texas's clemency procedures have been highlighted as suspect numerous times since Faulder. 284  Accordingly, Professor
Daniel Kobil considers it regrettable that courts have held “the deeply flawed Texas clemency process satisfies the Woodard
standard.” 285
Similarly, in Fugate v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, the Superior Court of Georgia denied an emergency motion for injunctive
relief after Fugate argued his due process rights were violated by the State *103  Board's refusal to disclose the information
that would be relied on during its clemency decision and its reliance on untrustworthy and inaccurate information. 286  The
court rejected Fugate's claim and, interpreting Woodard, held that judicial intervention is only warranted when a decision-maker
relied on “admittedly false information.” 287
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In Sepulvado v. Louisiana Board of Pardons & Parole, Sepulvado argued that the State denied him minimal due process
because Louisiana's clemency procedures did not guarantee a clemency hearing. 288  Rejecting this claim, the court found
there are no specific requirements that clemency proceedings must follow in order to achieve due process compliance. 289
Louisiana permitted all inmates to apply for clemency and to provide a variety of detail, including the reason for clemency,
at the initial application stage, which the court held did not fall below the Woodard standard. 290  Therefore, it was irrelevant
that, unless a hearing was granted, an inmate could not provide any further information. 291  The court highlighted, however,
that Louisiana procedure included an exception to this bar on additional evidence, which allowed certain inmates to introduce
evidence demonstrating actual innocence. 292  Relying on its earlier decision in Faulder, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded, “Sepulvado had full access to the clemency process, and the Board considered his application before denying him
a clemency hearing. Under the highly deferential Faulder standard of review, Sepulvado does not state a due-process-denial
claim for which relief can be granted.” 293
Again, in Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons & Paroles, a Florida clemency process was found not to breach the “minimal”
Woodard standard, despite the fact that one of the Board members who voted *104  against clemency was absent from an
earlier meeting where people spoke in favor of clemency. 294  The constitutionality of the process was upheld because, prior to
voting, the Board member at issue saw a written file and reviewed a summary of the oral presentations. 295
In the 2013 case Mann v. Palmer, Mann, who was scheduled to be executed on March 1, 2013, 296  argued that he was denied
due process when Florida procedure permitted the Governor, before signing the death warrant, to consider an updated clemency
investigation without giving Mann an opportunity to be heard and represented by counsel in those proceedings. 297  The majority
of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found this procedure did not violate due process, as the State had conducted a full
clemency hearing--which included notice and the opportunity to participate and have the representation of counsel--in 1985. 298
Judge Martin dissented in part, finding the due process issue in Mann's case unusual because the 1985 clemency proceeding,
although relating to the same underlying conviction, addressed a different sentence of death. 299  Notwithstanding the full
clemency investigation in 1985, Mann claimed he never had a clemency proceeding on the now pertinent death sentence imposed
in 1990 after he was resentenced by a newly empanelled jury. Mann further claimed that neither he nor his counsel had been
advised that the Governor had conducted an updated clemency investigation and additional clemency proceedings and that he
was denied access to records of those proceedings. Judge Martin, troubled by Mann's claims and wary of the Herrera decision,
stated:
I understand Mr. Mann to be arguing that he has arbitrarily been denied any access to Florida's clemency
process for the specific sentence of death set to be carried out this week. As I mentioned, this argument
gives me pause. That is because the Supreme Court *105  has acknowledged that clemency proceedings
have an important role to play in the administration of the death penalty. 300
Unprepared to label Mann's claim futile, Judge Martin concluded that “Mr. Mann will certainly suffer irreparable injury if his
execution is carried out, I would proceed with caution.” 301
These cases demonstrate that courts are applying Woodard's due process protection very narrowly, underscoring, again, the
expansive and legally unchecked nature of the clemency power. Although courts mention the “fail safe” function of clemency,
this characteristic, as well as any reference to innocence, is left unexpanded. Courts appear to be more concerned about mere
access to clemency procedures than the substance of these frameworks. As Kobil observes, “Woodard is viewed [by the courts]
as requiring states to provide very little in the way of process.” 302
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D. Challenges Related to the Role or Conduct of State Officials
Inmates have also argued that the role or conduct of state officials involved in the clemency process violated the Woodard
due process standard. For instance, inmates have challenged state clemency boards with members under investigation for
impropriety while considering clemency applications. In Gilreath, an inmate claimed his due process rights were violated when
two members of the state clemency board were under investigation by the State Attorney General's Office at the time his
clemency application was denied; the investigations, Gilreath argued, gave rise to an appearance of impropriety because the
board members might have voted to deny clemency in order to curry favor with the Attorney General. 303  The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected Gilreath's claim, noting there was no evidence that: the Attorney General regularly advocated *106
for or against clemency; anyone familiar with the State's clemency procedure would believe the Attorney General's Office
was an advocate in the clemency proceeding; or indicated the result desired by the Attorney General for Gilreath's clemency
proceeding. Moreover, the court concluded that the mere “appearance” of impropriety would not violate due process. 304
The 2001 case of Parker v. State Board of Pardons & Paroles is a more extreme example. 305  There, Parker not only claimed
that the investigation of two active board members--including the Chairman--for criminal wrongdoing violated due process, 306
but further asserted that relief was warranted in light of the Board Chairman's statement that “[n]o one on death row [will]
ever get clemency as long as [I am] Chairman of the Board,” coupled with the Chairman's unique control over the voting
process. 307  The Eleventh Circuit rejected both claims, relying on Gilreath's holding that an appearance of impropriety does not
violate due process, and applying Woodard's low threshold for due process compliance. The court reasoned that, assuming the
Chairman's statement was actually made, the three-year time lapse between the statement and Parker's clemency proceedings
was a “long enough period to allow [the Chairman] to reevaluate his position so that he could now fairly review Parker's
clemency application.” 308  The court additionally noted the Chairman's testimony indicated that he “now has an open mind and
listens to all of the clemency cases that come before him prior to voting on them.” 309  As such, the court affirmed the district
court's denial of Parker's requested relief. 310
*107  Other inmates have challenged the Governor's role or conduct in clemency proceedings. In Duvall v. Keating, for
example, the Governor of Oklahoma had made a statement similar to the statement at issue in Parker, namely that he would not
grant clemency for murderers. 311  The court rejected Duvall's due process claim because, since Duvall was never recommended
for clemency by the Oklahoma clemency board, the Governor did not engage in the clemency proceeding. 312
The issue in Bacon v. Lee was whether Woodard's minimal due process protection included an inmate's right to have his
or her clemency request reviewed by an executive possessing the level of impartiality required of a judge presiding over an
adjudicatory proceeding. 313  The court ruled that it did not, stating:
We do not believe Woodard intended to repudiate entirely the cardinal principle that clemency decisions
are normally not a matter to be litigated in courts of law. . . . Instead, we conclude . . . that state clemency
procedures generally comport with due process when a prisoner is afforded notice and the opportunity to
participate in clemency procedures, and the clemency decision, though substantively a discretionary one,
is not reached by means of a procedure such as a coin toss. 314
In the 2013 case of Schad v. Brewer, a death-row inmate argued that the Governor's Office placed undue influence on members
of the *108  Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to vote against clemency, particularly when voting on clemency for high
profile inmates, in violation of due process. 315  A number of previous Board members provided evidence that suggested they
were not reappointed because the Governor was “unhappy” with their votes in certain cases. 316  The court rejected Schad's
claims, holding that “even if [the previous Board members'] impressions were accurate, this does not demonstrate that the
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current Board members are incapable of objectivity or are biased.” 317  That said, the court's approach did differ slightly from
that taken in Bacon. The Shad court seemed prepared to assume that “minimal due process applicable to clemency proceedings
pursuant to Woodard includes access to an impartial decision maker.” 318
Cases challenging the role or conduct of state officials during the clemency process further demonstrate how courts are
applying Woodard narrowly and, seemingly, are willing to overlook the biases of decision-makers. Notably, courts are reluctant
to demand the same objectivity of individuals making clemency decisions as is demanded of court officials--even where
applications are based on innocence claims--notwithstanding that these individuals are charged with a role equivalent to that
of adjudicating guilt and innocence.
Overall, with respect to due process and related doctrine, some courts acknowledge clemency's “innocence” role, following
Herrera; however, most courts continue to underscore that clemency is not “the business of the courts,” and are, as a result,
antipathetic to inmates' claims. As noted by Kobil, “[t]hus far, virtually every challenge to state clemency procedures based on
Woodard has been summarily rejected by lower courts, despite allegations of serious irregularities.” 319  As the cases discussed
above demonstrate, most courts are applying Woodard's due process protections narrowly and are focusing on mere access
to clemency proceedings rather than the substance of clemency frameworks. For instance, proceedings tainted *109  by the
appearance of impropriety, partiality, and bias, as well as those lacking in transparency and/or infrastructures for supporting
inmates' development of their clemency applications have each failed to trigger judicial intervention. Presently, therefore, the
sanguine view of clemency, as adopted by the USSC in Herrera, does not seem “to comport with the practical realities of the
clemency process,” 320  an actuality that has been “frankly acknowledged by lower courts.” 321
CONCLUSION
Clemency is an integral part of the American criminal justice system. However, like those before them, American executives
primarily utilize the clemency power for political expedience rather than to remedy wrongful convictions. To that extent, the
USSC's decision in Herrera catapulted clemency into a role it had never truly served. The Innocence Movement is now in
full stride--with more than fourteen hundred exonerations listed on the National Registry of Exonerations, over three hundred
and twenty of which have been proven conclusively by post-conviction DNA evidence. 322  Consequently, the extent to which
clemency is fit to fulfill its “innocence” role is now critical. This article urges that there are serious deficiencies in the operation of
clemency systems across America, particularly from the viewpoint of innocents. In addition to the lack of historical precedent for
remedying innocence claims, current state clemency frameworks showcase a myriad of obstacles to the meaningful assessment
of innocence claims, such a lack of transparency, imbalanced administrative board compositions, and barriers to meaningful
review, such as high eligibility thresholds and unfavorable application procedures. These obstacles are exacerbated by the
minimal constitutional protection afforded to clemency  *110  applicants under Woodard--a standard which courts have
routinely applied narrowly, focusing on mere access to clemency procedures rather than the substance of state frameworks.
Moreover, courts demonstrate clear reluctance to interfere with even the most troublesome clemency practices.
Fortunately, there is some acknowledgement of clemency's innocence role under Herrera by states and courts, as evidenced
by innocence-focused procedures in states like Montana, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas and by a few cautious
acknowledgements in judicial decisions. Still, more must be done. While it is beyond the scope of this article to make detailed
recommendations, several suggestions include: (1) developing innocence-focused clemency procedures and innocence-based
clemency applications in each state; (2) encouraging clemency boards to conduct more transparent and expansive reviews
of innocence applications and to reject trial court findings in appropriate cases; and (3) applying a broader interpretation of
Woodard's due process requirements. 323
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Clemency is a hostile environment for innocents. Given the USSC's decision in Herrera and the ever-increasing tally of
exonerations, action must be taken to ensure clemency applications--especially those based on innocence claims-- are fairly
and effectively reviewed.
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adequacy of state clemency mechanisms, the Osborne Court recognized that a prisoner may retain a state-created “liberty interest in
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majority's decision. However, I am deeply troubled by the unusual nature of the court's conclusion. On the one hand, the district court
assumed, for purposes of decision, that Chairman Ray made the statement that “No one on death row [will] ever get clemency as
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